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Review Essay

A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision
Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in
Legal Theory and Practice*
Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law.
By Martha C. Nussbaum, Princeton University Press, 2004.

Reviewed by Peter H. Huangt and
Christopher J. Andersonif
Professor Martha C. Nussbaum is an accomplished scholar
in an impressive variety of fields. Drawing on her diverse academic backgrounds, Nussbaum has written extensively about
emotions and their importance for law from the perspective of
her primary specialty, philosophy.1 Her book Hiding from Humanity criticizes the roles that two particular emotions, disgust
and shame, play in the law. 2 Its central thesis is that, as legal
actors, we should be wary of disgust and shame because indulging in those emotions allows us to hide from our humanity* The authors thank the following institutions for their support: the Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science; the James E. Beasley
School of Law, Temple University; and the Psychology Department, Temple
University. Thanks also to Deborah Small for introducing us to each other. Finally, thanks to Susan Fiske, Jonathan Haidt, Rebecca Huss, Toni Massaro,
Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Daniel Shapiro, and Amy Sinden for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
t Member, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, and
Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law,
Temple University. J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D., Harvard University;
A.B., Princeton University.
tt Assistant Professor, Psychology Department, Temple University.
Ph.D., University at Albany, State University of New York (SUNY); B.A.,
Binghamton University, SUNY.
1. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Lau, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
2. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 13 (2004) [hereinafter HIDING FROM HUMANITY].
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both our humanity in the general sense and also those specific
features of our humanity that are most animalistic: our vulnerability and mortality. 3 In 2004, the Association of American
Publishers awarded Hiding from Humanity its Professional
and Scholarly Publishing Award for Law. 4 Many have praised
it, 5 while others have been more critical. 6 In light of the broad
range of fields that Nussbaum draws upon in Hiding from Humanity, the book has predictably spawned much interesting
discussion and commentary by law professors, 7 literary scholars,8 philosophers, 9 political scientists, 10 and the media.1 1
Our unique contribution to this lively discourse surrounding Hiding from Humanity is an analysis of Nussbaum's argument from the perspective of recent advances in research about
emotions, happiness, and well-being made by economists, 12 legal academics, 13 negotiation scholars, 14 neuroscientists, 15 and
3. See id. at 14-15.
4. Press Release, Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Inc., Association of American
Publishers Honors Outstanding Achievements in Professional and Scholarly
Publishing (Feb. 8, 2005), http://www.pspcentral.org/awards/winners_2004
.doc.
5. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, Additional Reviews and/or Endorsements for Nussbaum, M.C.: Hiding for Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the
Law, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/quotes/q7697.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2006).
6. See, e.g., David Benatar, Book Review - Hiding from Humanity,
LIFEWATCH, Sept. 9, 2004 (book review), http://www.lifewatch-eap.com/poc/
view doc.php?id=2321&type=book&cn=216.
7. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2698 (2005) (book review).
8. See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Hiding from Humanity, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 207
(2005) (book review).
9. See, e.g., John Kekes, Book Review, 114 MIND 439 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist, Book Review, 14 LAW & POL. BOOK
REV. 708 (2004), http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/
nussbaum904.htm.
11. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, Nussbaum, M.C.: Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/
titles/7697.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
12.

See, e.g.,

ECONOMICS AND HAPPINESS: FRAMING

THE ANALYSIS

(Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2006); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS
STUTZER, HAPPINESS AND ECONOMICS: HOW THE ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS
AFFECT WELL-BEING (2002); HAPPINESS IN ECONOMICS (Richard A. Easterlin
ed., 2002); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE

(2005); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402 (2002).

13. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45
B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1368-70 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Educating Ourselves Towards a Progressive (and Happier) Tax: A Commentary on Griffith's

2006]

EMOTIONAL LEGAL DECISIONMAKING

1047

psychologists. 1 6 We share Nussbaum's interest in how affect,

emotions, and moods influence decision making, 17 decision
avoidance, 18 and judgment. 19 One of us has analyzed psychological game-theoretic models to examine the role of guilt in
upholding social norms and organizational cultures; 20 parental
choices regarding reproductive genetic technologies; 21 fiduciary
duties and trust in corporate and securities law; 22 and the in-

fluence of shame on bargaining over property rights 23 and compliance with international environmental law. 24 The other has

analyzed how to predict and normatively evaluate the inaction
of individuals presented with opportunities that could benefit
them, and with opportunities to help alleviate great human suffering, such as genocide and poverty. 25

Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Terry A.
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 28
LAw & HUMAN BEHAV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn
.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=726864; Diane M. Ring, Why Happiness?: A
Commentary on Griffith's Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 1413, 1415-16 (2004).

14. See, e.g., Daniel L. Shapiro, A Negotiator's Guide to Emotion: Four
'Laws' to Effective Practice, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2001, at 3.
15. See, e.g., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTION (Richard D. Lane &
Lynn Nadel eds., 2002).
16. See, e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS (2006).
17. See Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materialityof Information and the Reasonablenessof Investors, 13
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99 (2005).

18. See Christopher J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing. Forms
of Decision Avoidance Result from Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL.
139 (2003).

19. See Peter H. Huang, Regulating IrrationalExuberance and Anxiety in
Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR
501 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005).
20. See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A
Theory of Social Norms and OrganizationalCultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
390 (1994).
21. See Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 639 (1999).

22. See Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003).
23. See Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in PropertyRights Bargaining,79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000).

24. See Peter H. Huang, InternationalEnvironmentalLaw and Emotional
Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S237 (2002).
25. See Christopher J. Anderson, The Functions of Emotion in Decision
Making and Decision Avoidance, in DO EMOTIONS HELP OR HURT DECISION
MAKING? (Roy Baumeister et al. eds., forthcoming 2006); Anderson, supra note
18.

1048

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1045

We concur with many of Nussbaum's conclusions and find
much to admire in her scholarship and in Hiding from Humanity in particular. Yet even though Nussbaum drew from many
disciplines in Hiding from Humanity, she left other potentially
fertile fields, such as neuroscience, untouched. In addition, despite the book's recent publication date, a number of subsequent developments have occurred in affective, cognitive, and
social neuroscience; 26 dispute resolution; 2 7 economics; 28 affective psychology; 29 and positive psychology. 30 These developments have not gone unnoticed by other academics. For example, two negotiation scholars, Professor Roger Fisher, who is
31
known for coauthoring a landmark book about negotiation,
and Professor Daniel Shapiro, who is associate director of the
Harvard Negotiation Project, 32 recently observed that "strong
emotions serve a useful function. You do not want to ignore
emotions and lose their energy and information." 33 Other examples of advances in recent scholarly understanding about
emotions that are relevant to Nussbaum's thesis are experimental studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to examine the neural bases of decision making and
moral judgment, including many by her cousin, Joshua
Greene. 34 Cognitive neuroscientist Elizabeth Phelps and social
26. See, e.g., SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: KEY READINGS (John T. Cacioppo &
Gary G. Berntson eds., 2005); THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES (Michael S.
Gazzaniga ed., 3d ed. 2004); SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE

(forthcoming Summer 2006) (featuring research that uses neuroscience
techniques to understand the social and emotional aspects of the human mind
and human behavior).
27. See, e.g., LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (3d ed. 2005).

28. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic
Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2005); Daniel
McFadden, The New Science of Pleasure: Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of Well-Being, Frisch Lecture at the Econometric Society World Congress, London (Aug. 20, 2005), http://emlab.berkeley.edu/wp/mcfadden0105/
ScienceofPleasure.pdf.
29.

See, e.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein &

Paul Slovic eds., forthcoming Aug. 2006).
30. See, e.g., Shelly L. Gable & Jonathan Haidt, What (and Why) Is Positive Psychology?, 9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 103 (2005).
31. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981).
32. PON: Harvard Negotiation Project, http://www.pon.harvard.edu/

researchlprojects/hnp.php3 (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
33.

ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMO-

TIONS AS YOU NEGOTIATE 149 (2005).
34. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional
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psychologist Mahzarin Banaji have used fMRI to link people's
brain activity to the way they evaluate racial groups. 35 Other
studies provide fMRI evidence that social exclusion activates
36
the same brain regions as feeling physical sensations of pain.
Our contribution is to reassess Nussbaum's arguments in light
of these research developments.
Our analysis of Hiding from Humanity is organized as follows. We first provide an overview of the interactions of emotions, psychology, and laws. Next, we analyze the roles that revulsion can and should play in law. We then examine the roles
that saving and losing "face" can and should play in law. Our
fourth section speculates about the constructive role that positive and negative emotions may play in law, to respond to
Nussbaum's argument that two negative emotions, disgust and
shame, threaten to disrupt the functioning of the legal system.
Finally, our conclusion offers ideas for future research based on
the foundation suggested by Hiding from Humanity.

I. PSYCHOLOGY, EMOTIONS, AND THE LAW
A number of scholars from such diverse fields and perspec40
39
38
tives as anthropology, 37 economics, history, neuroscience,
Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); Joshua Greene,
Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE INNATE

MIND 338 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2005); Joshua Greene & Jonathan
Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCY B 1775 (2004); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt,
How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517
(2002).
35. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of
Race Evaluation PredictsAmygdala Activity, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
729 (2000).
36. See Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study
of Social Exclusion, 302 SCIENCE 290, 292 (2003); Naomi I. Eisenberger &

Matthew D. Lieberman, Why It Hurts to Be Left Out: The Neurocognitive Overlap Between Physical and Social Pain, in THE SOCIAL OUTCAST: OSTRACISM,
SOCIAL EXCLUSION, REJECTION, AND BULLYING 109, 123 (Kipling D. Williams
et al. eds., 2005); Matthew D. Lieberman & Naomi I. Eisenberger, A Pain by

Any Other Name (Rejection, Exclusion, Ostracism) Still Hurts the Same: The
Role of Dorsal Anterior Cingulate in Social and Physical Pain, in SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE: PEOPLE THINKING ABOUT PEOPLE 167, 181-82 (John T. Cacioppo et al. eds., 2006).
37. See, e.g., BIOCULTURAL APPROACHES TO THE EMOTIONS (Alexander
Laban Hinton ed., 1999).
38. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 408 (2004).
39. See, e.g., LLOYD DEMAUSE, THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF NATIONS (2002).
40. See, e.g., WHO NEEDS EMOTIONS?: THE BRAIN MEETS THE ROBOT
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philosophy, 4 1 psychology, 42 and sociology, 43 are (re)discovering
emotions. American psychology, for example, largely avoided
the use of certain emotions as constructs for much of the twentieth century 44 while under the influence of the philosophy of
positivism. 45 Since then, mental constructs have emerged
within cognitive science, 46 paving the way for the study of emotions. Emotions promise to play an important role in twenty-

first century psychology; the American Psychological Association has founded a new journal 4 7 dedicated to the study of emotion, other new journals specializing in emotion-related articles
have emerged, 48 and we have noticed a trend towards established psychology journals publishing more articles about emotions.
Many legal scholars have also turned their attention to the
roles that emotions can play in formulating legal thought, practice, and principles. 49 One example of such scholarship is Hid(Jean-Marc Fellous & Michael A. Arbib eds., 2005).
41. See, e.g., THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS
ON EMOTIONS (Robert C. Solomon ed., 2004).
42. See, e.g., K.T. STRONGMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE TO THEORY (5th ed. 2003).
43. See, e.g., JONATHAN H. TURNER & JAN E. STETS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EMOTIONS (2005).
44. See, e.g., Bunmi 0. Olatunji & Craig N. Sawchuk, Disgust: Characteristic Features, Social Manifestations,and Clinical Implications, 24 J. SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 932, 933, 934 fig.1 (2005) (reporting results of a general
literature search for the terms "anger," "disgust," and "fear" in the PsychInfo
reference database from 1960 through 2003). There are few citations referencing any of the terms through 1964; then fear shows a linear increase in references through the present, anger follows with a parallel linear increase beginning in 1981, and disgust shows a relatively miniscule increase starting in the
late 1990s). Id.
45. See, e.g., AUGUSTE COMTE, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
(Frederick Ferr6 ed., Paul Descours & H. Gordon Jones trans., revised by Frederick Ferr6, 1970) (1905).
46. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND'S NEW SCIENCE (1985)
(providing a history of the cognitive revolution).
47. EMOTION.
48. See, e.g., COGNITION & EMOTION; COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE.
49. See, e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Kathryn
Abrams, The Progressof Passion,100 MICH. L. REV. 1602 (2002); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An
Empirical Test With Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
1 (2005); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation,
12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992); Laura Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the
Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699 (1995); Jules Lobel & George
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ing from Humanity, which takes as its foundation a number of
hypothesized connections between emotion and law. 50 On the

surface, psychology-the origin of much research on emotionand law appear to be rather different fields. For the empirical
psychologist, however, the law can be seen as a domain of human behavior, albeit a complex one in terms of the number and
variety of actors and motivations that influence behaviors and
outcomes. The trend in recognizing this connection between the
fields is evidenced by notable works in psychology that treat le51
gal actors, such as jurors, as the focus of empirical analysis.
To legal scholars and philosophers such as Nussbaum, psychological analysis represents an avenue for scrutinizing the basis
of law and for questioning our assumptions about the origins
and functions of law.
Nussbaum is most compelling when she contends that our
system of law cannot be understood without some reference to
emotions, which indicate what is important to those persons
the law should protect. 52 Nussbaum portrays emotions and
vulnerability as fundamentally intertwined, and interprets
laws as defenses against human vulnerability to a wide variety
of harms.5 3 This portrayal of emotion is more helpful than competing interpretations that focus on debatable elements that
only apply to some emotions in some contexts. 54 Nussbaum
convincingly portrays vulnerability as a necessary condition for

Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005); Toni
Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880
(1991); Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW,
supra, at 80; Toni Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal
Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645 (1997); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth
V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 (1988); Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO.
L.J. 1977 (2001).
50. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 5-12.
51.

See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (2001); REID HASTIE, INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

JUROR
52.
53.
54.

DECISION MAKING (1994).
See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 5-6.
Id. at 6-7.
See, e.g., NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 69-71 (1987) (providing an

often-cited definition of emotions as states of "action readiness"). But see
Anderson, supra note 18, at 162 (pointing out that decision conflict and emotions such as regret often lead to inaction and passivity).

1052

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1045

emotion, 55 and thus provides a strong case for seeing the legal
field, which provides protection from, and recourse for,
breached vulnerabilities, as being intimately tied to the human
experience of emotion.
Nussbaum argues that the emotions of those deciding cases
and making the law impact the law by acting as a variable on
the perceived seriousness or wrongness of an offense, and more
importantly, by influencing which acts a society deems necessary to curtail, outlaw, or punish. 56 Nussbaum's arguments,
valuable as they are, strike an odd chord with the rest of Hiding from Humanity. Whereas this part of her argument gives
strong reasons for both the descriptive and normative relevance
of emotion to the law, the remainder of Hiding from Humanity
is devoted to criticizing two specific emotions, disgust and
shame, for their perceived role in law.5 7 There may be reasons
why some emotions are relevant while others are not. For example, Nussbaum hypothesizes that the cognitive content of
disgust does not include beliefs about harm. Cognitive content
involving experienced harms are, in her view, necessary for
pertinence to the law, whereas emotions experienced in the absence of real harm are not appropriate for consideration in a le58
gal forum.
While the relevance of some emotions but not others is debatable, it nonetheless seems odd to begin by discussing the
relevance of emotion to law when constructing an argument for
the irrelevance of two emotions to law. For this reason we have
chosen specifically to highlight some positive, constructive interfaces between law and emotion in our fourth section after we
analyze the main theme of Hidingfrom Humanity, which is the
role that revulsion and saving face can and should play in our
legal system.
II. REVULSION AND DISGUST
Nussbaum states that "[d]isgust appears to be an especially visceral emotion" and cites psychologist Paul Rozin's
55. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 6-7.
56. Id. at 19-56.
57. Id. at 71-350.
58. See E-mail from Martha Nussbaum, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago Law School, to Peter
Huang, Member, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, and
Harold E. Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law,
Temple University (Nov. 14, 2005, 13:21 CST) (on file with authors).
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definition of disgust as involving revulsion at its core. 59 Nussbaum finds disgust "unworthy of guiding public action" and "a
dangerous social sentiment." 60 Does this mean it can never be
proper to impose legal sanctions on the basis of revulsion or
disgust? Should laws, and those involved in making and interpreting them, ever consider revulsion or disgust?
A. THE RESEARCH
One theoretical approach predicts, and experimental evidence confirms, that once certain emotions are triggered in a
particular situation, those emotions will continue to change
risk estimates and behavior toward risk in situations unrelated
to the original triggering context. 61 In particular, anger, once it
is triggered in a specific situation, will evoke more optimistic
risk estimates and more risk-seeking behavior in other unre62
lated situations; fear causes the opposite pair of effects. Similarly, a recent experimental study demonstrated that disgust
induced by irrelevant, prior situations will carry over to normatively unrelated decisions and reduce how much buyers are
willing to pay for an item and how much sellers are willing to
63
accept for that same item.
Experimentally-induced disgust has also been shown to
persist beyond initial eliciting situations and to powerfully impact subsequent cognition and behavior. One recent and highly
relevant experimental study provides the first demonstration
64
that augmenting disgust carries over to moral judgments.
This research suggests that individuals and lawmakers will
find it challenging to contain disgust and that existing law
might reflect such a struggle.
59.

HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 87.

60. Id. at 171.
61. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward A Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice, 14
COGNITION & EMOTION 473, 476-80 (2000) (presenting an appraisal-tendency
theory of emotions).
62. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived
Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 144, 144
(2003) (presenting supporting experimental evidence); Jennifer S. Lerner &
Dacher Keltner, Fear,Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
146, 146 (2001) (same).
63. See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryover Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 337, 340
(2004).
64. See Thalia Wheatley & Jonathan Haidt, Hypnotic Disgust Makes
Moral Judgments More Severe, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 780 (2005).
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B. THE VALUE OF DISGUST TO THE LAW

Hiding from Humanity takes the strong position that disgust is never constructive in law, and in those cases where it
might seem to be useful, indignation is actually the appropriate, constructive emotion. 65 Nussbaum reviews a variety of actors with varying ideological perspectives that support the role
of disgust in legal decision making. 6 6 Not surprisingly, several
of these positions are conservative. Lord Patrick Devlin suggests that society has a rightful desire for self-preservation,
and monitoring and responding to its constituency's disgust is
central to that preservation. 67 Another position, held by the
former chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, Professor Leon R. Kass, 68 sees an ambiguous "wisdom" in disgust
that transcends reason. 69 These positions are difficult to agree
with, since the first, or both taken together, are a recipe for
constructing a closed society. 70 However, liberals and progressives have also discussed the value of disgust. For example,
criminal law professor Dan M. Kahan argues that disgust is a
useful tool for steadfast and potent condemnations of cruelty,
71
such as transgressions of human rights.

Arguments in favor of disgust's role in legal decision making must be analyzed carefully, for rejection of them is at the
heart of Hiding from Humanity's argument. Nussbaum portrays each of these arguments as fundamentally different, save
for their agreement that disgust is relevant to law as more than
a nuisance harm7 2 to individuals. 73 We suggest they have more

in common: for one, condemning cruelty is arguably part of the
"wisdom" of disgust and one of the defining values a society
through its shared notions of disgust may seek to promote. To
the extent that an individual shares the values of her society,
65. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 75. Nussbaum defines
"indignation" as anger triggered by unfairness. Id.
66. Id. at 75-87.
67.

See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).

68. See The President's Council on Bioethics: Leon R. Kass, M.D.,
http://www.bioethics.gov/about/kass.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
69. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 79.
70. Although Hiding from Humanity portrays this as a conservative argument, it can and has been used across the political spectrum. See, e.g., Richard M. Ebeling, Political Correctness and the Closed Society, FREEDOM DAILY,
Jun. 1992, available at http://www.fff.org/freedom/0692b.asp.
71. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 84.
72. That is, based on an unpleasant mental or physiological experience.
73. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 85-87.
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that individual will arguably welcome any emotion that would
promote goals associated with those values, and underpin legal
decisions that support those values. Thus, although people of
varying political affiliations might define cruelty differently,
they all might agree that certain cruel acts are disgusting; a
shared disgust with those acts is a potentially relevant indicator that the acts should be abolished.
The core of Hiding from Humanity's normative argument
against basing law on disgust is twofold: (1) we cannot trust
disgust to carry innate wisdom or any meaningful correlation to
what is really harmful, 74 and (2) disgust prompts turning away
from a stimulus or issue rather than constructively handling
7
it.
5 Nussbaum convincingly wins the first point by citing a
great deal of psychological research that shows how disgust can
be transferred to irrelevant objects or persons in a process
called "psychological contamination." 76 Through this process,
noncontaminated, nonharmful persons come to be seen as disgusting by their similarity to, contact with, or manipulative association with a primary disgusting object. While these people
cause no harm, a society can come to see them as dangerous,
and in the process, the disgust-seer can become a real source of
harm in response to an imagined source of harm. This is a
compelling argument, and Nussbaum gives many historical and
current examples of the process, including the subordination of
women 77 and Jewish persons. 78 However, this argument alone
is insufficient to convince the reader that it is necessary to
purge disgust from legal and social thinking. We draw a different conclusion from the same information, which is that before
disgust can be potentially useful, it must be actively managed.
Determinations of what is found disgusting and why must be
made.
Nussbaum's second argument is that because disgust is
rooted in fear of contamination, it motivates the disgusted person to get away from what is disgusting as soon as possible.7 9
Although Nussbaum places a great deal of emphasis on social
disgust, disgust's primary content is toward nonhuman objects,
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which is also relevant to the law.8 0 People respond to disgust by

distancing themselves from the object. In Nussbaum's view,
this "out of sight, out of mind" reflex undermines the ability to
productively use disgust in fighting for progressive causes such
as human rights. This is an oversimplification, and at least in
some cases, personal experience discredits this. For example,
disgusting images from the genocide in Rwanda motivate some
to turn away from the information and avoid learning more
about it, which in turn prevents them from actively working to
prevent future crimes against humanity. For others, the images
are seared into the memory, and they are thereby motivated to
support the prevention of such crimes.8 1 This second response
might also be seen as "turning away" from what is disgusting,
but it entails a different kind of turning away that requires seeing one's own inaction and passive bystanding 2 as complicit in
producing the disgusting image.
Distancing can have the positive effect of causing one to
separate from a group of perpetrators with which one is complicit. Distancing is also productive when the disgust is in relation to risky, nonhuman sources of disgust, such as animal or
other carriers of viruses or disease. Where people have a tendency to be attracted to something that spreads disease, disgust could be used to motivate legislation. For instance, the
AIDS virus can be spread through dirty IV needles re-used by
illegal IV drug users. The drug users do not have sufficient disgust with the dirty needle to overcome their attraction to drugs,
and it is illegal to supply clean needles to these persons. People
should find it disgusting that a person is forced to use a dirty
IV needle when a clean one could be provided, thereby reducing
the AIDS virus transmission risk. Distancing oneself from the
disgust of this image could mean not thinking or caring about
endangered drug users, or it could prompt action to address the
barriers the law has erected between the clean needle and the
drug user. Hiding from Humanity does not consider the multi80.

See Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon, A Perspective on Disgust, 94 PSY-

CHOL. REV. 23, 27-29 (1987).

81. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Mass Murder: Why Do We Ignore It? (Nov. 14,
2005) (unpublished slides presented as part of the speech, Paul Slovic, Address
at the Society for Judgment and Decision Making (Nov. 14, 2005), on file with
authors) (proposing that people ignore genocide in part because available information fails to convey meaningful affect and emotions).
82. See generally ERVIN STAUB, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL:
WHY CHILDREN, ADULTS, AND GROUPS HELP AND HARM OTHERS (2003) (dis-

cussing the sources of and responses to good and evil acts).
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ple forms of "turning away," and thus may underestimate the
usefulness of disgust. More behavioral research is required to
understand the possible responses to disgust and the personal
and contextual factors that determine them before a definitive
stance is taken on Nussbaum's argument.
C. ELIMINATING DISGUST FROM THE LAW
83
Given disgust's status as a basic human emotion, it is
unlikely that it could ever be completely extirpated from society. The question that remains, and the position Nussbaum advocates,8 4 is whether disgust can be eliminated from legal decision making.
The presence of shared notions of disgust in a society will
continually put pressure on legislators, jurors, lawyers, and
judges to incorporate those notions into law. In our view, for
the antidisgust in law position to become successful, a society
would have to become "disgusted with disgust," which is to view
it as an emotion too contaminated to be considered in important decisions. Society would need to be persuaded that disgust
is a fundamentally damaging emotion and that it promotes
vulnerability instead of preventing it. This change requires a
broad-perhaps impossibly broad-social consensus. While becoming "disgusted with disgust" might seem to be a contradictory notion, Hiding from Humanity takes a first step toward
persuading society to that position by illustrating several unpleasant uses of disgust in the law that many will likely find
reprehensible, such as the subordination and extermination of
Jews during World War 11.85 Relating "disgust with disgust" to
larger segments of the population is a worthwhile challenge
that, if Nussbaum and her readers are serious about their position, we should soon see attempts to tackle.
It will, however, be difficult to convince society that it
should feel "disgust with disgust." As humans, "we are all built
with a pair of related emotions-disgust and elevation
....[P]eople, or cultures, seem predisposed (though not preordained) to interpret their social worlds in terms of a vertical
dimension in which divinity, virtue, and physical purity are up,

83. See Rozin & Fallon, supra note 80, at 23.
84. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 75. But cf. id. at 120-22
(suggesting that a disgust-free society may not be an ideal norm given disgust's value and beneficial role in certain aspects of life and thought).
85. See id. at 108-14.
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and bestiality, vice, and physical pollution are down."8 6 Research by psychology professor Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues provides evidence across contexts and cultures that
human beings find it easy to link together divinity, morality,
and physical purity.8 7 Thus, it can be quite natural for people to
be convinced that they should feel disgust, even if that disgust
is based upon phantom or unjustified associations. It might be
possible to convince people that they should experience disgust
about disgust. But a far more difficult endeavor would be to
convince people to actually feel disgust about disgust. This difficulty relates to the fact that disgust, like many emotions, is
usually automatic and unconscious.8 8 Nussbaum does not address this feature of the emotion.
One of the reasons why Hiding from Humanity takes such
a strong line on disgust is that Nussbaum views disgust as an
inherently hierarchical emotion.8 9 However, it might better be
thought of as inherently categorical. For disgust to be hierarchical, one must see social disgust as the core of disgust, which
it is not; social disgust is a relatively late-occurring generalization of disgust. Because disgust categorizes the world into contaminated and uncontaminated objects and persons, it motivates actors to avoid potentially contaminated objects and
persons. This in turn creates a sort of hierarchy when applied
to persons if one conflates avoidance with low status, which is
not completely correct. 90 Even if one were to grant that disgust

86.

Jonathan Haidt & Sara Algoe, Moral Amplification and the Emotions

that Attach Us to Saints and Demons, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 322, 329 (Jeff Greenberg et al. eds., 2004).
87. See HAIDT, supra note 16, at 181-212; Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect,
Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 613 (1993); Jonathan Haidt et al., Body, Psyche, and Culture:
The Relationship Between Disgust and Morality, 9 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING
SOCIETIES 107 (1997); Jonathan Haidt, Elevation and the Positive Psychology
of Morality, in

FLOURISHING: POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LIFE WELL-

LIVED 275 (Corey L. M. Keyes & Jonathan Haidt eds., 2003); Jonathan Haidt
& Matthew A. Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (2001); Jonathan
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
88. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES 117-35
(2002).
89. See E-Mail from Martha Nussbaum to Peter Huang, supra note 58.
90. In most species, dominant individuals are the most avoided. See Joseph Henrich & Francisco J. Gil-White, The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural
Transmission, 22 EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAV. 165, 166-69 (2001).
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is inherently hierarchical, for most citizens this would not be
viewed as a problematic element of its role in law. This is because most societies' concept of complete morality includes a
concern for preserving respect for a hierarchy and displaying
behaviors that are appropriate to one's place in a hierarchy. 91
Social psychologist, Susan Fiske, has constructed a stereotype content model of emotional prejudices, including contempt
or disgust. 92 Fiske's research suggests that disgust and other

emotional prejudicial reactions are immediate and not necessarily conscious. 93 Fiske's recent neuroscientific research utilizing fMRI techniques finds that categorizing people to be interchangeable members of some outgroup promotes one response
in an almond-shaped brain region known as the amygdala,
which is associated with vigilance and alarm, and another response in a different brain region known as the insula, which is
characteristic of disgust or arousal, depending on social context. 94 Utilizing methods of cognitive and social neuroscience,
Fiske's research shows that emotional prejudices, including
disgust, are not inevitable, but depend on one's cognitive and
social goals. 95 In other words, even though disgust is not necessarily conscious, it is not inevitable because it depends on a
person's thoughts and social motivations.
Fiske has conducted research that demonstrates not only
how and why emotional prejudice can occur, but also how and
why particular social contexts can discourage prejudice. 96
Fiske's research finds that people easily categorize others, es-

91. See Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice:
Emotions and Intuitions Related to Ingroup, Hierarchy, and Purity, 19 SOC.
JUST. RES. (forthcoming 2006).
92. See Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content:
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878 (2002).
93. See Jamie Chamberlin, What's Behind Prejudice?, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct. 2004, at 34.
94. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Why OrdinaryPeople Torture Enemy Prisoners, 306 SCIENCE 1482, 1482 (2004).
95. See, e.g., Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial
Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation,
16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 102 (2005). See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging
Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005) (reviewing developing literature applying neuroscientific tools in examining social psychological responses to race).
96.

See SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2004); Susan T. Fiske, What We Know Now About Bias
and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 123 (2002).
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pecially based upon observable indices such as their age, gender, and race. 97 Individuals require motivation to get past such
categorization in order to learn about others. 98 Fiske's laboratory studies demonstrate that depending on another individual
or being a team member with someone motivates us to get past
our stereotyping. 99 Another experimental study by Fiske demonstrates that competition sometimes causes individuation, because each person is motivated to learn how others act. 100
Thus, Fiske's research suggests that antidiscrimination
laws can mitigate prejudice by creating social contexts that foster cooperation, which in turn leads to individuation, rather
than stereotypical attitudes of disgust. Fiske's research also
suggests that affirmative action in higher education and employment might combat discrimination, but only insofar as it
places individuals on a common team, rather than in competition with each other for grades, promotions, and other positional goods.' 0 1
III. SAVING FACE AND LOSING IT
Nussbaum takes great care in differentiating shame from
disgust, guilt, depression, embarrassment, humiliation, and
rage. 102 As Nussbaum points out, shame is revealed in one's
face by blushing. 103 A famous sociologist who is well-known for
analyzing human interaction, Erving Goffman, utilized the notion of "face" to explain how Americans manage their public
image and social presentations. 104 Nussbaum argues in Hiding

97. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 2d ed.
1998).
98. See Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought
and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 122
(2004).
99. See Susan T. Fiske, Interdependence and the Reduction of Prejudice,in
REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 115 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000).

100. See Janet B. Ruscher & Susan T. Fiske, Interpersonal Competition
Can Cause IndividuatingProcesses, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 832,
837 (1990).
101. For a discussion on the economic, epidemiological, public health, and
sociological impacts of competition, see ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER:
WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS 146-58 (1999); MICHAEL
MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME:

How SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS OUR

HEALTH AND LONGEVITY 92-95 (2004).
102. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 203-11.
103. Id. at 173-74.
104. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
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from Humanity that shame is an improper, inappropriate, and
unreliable basis for law, especially with respect to punishment
10 5
in criminal law.
A. CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN THE
EXPERIENCE OF SHAME
Some people can feel shame in unintended and undesired
ways, even from noncriminal regulations. For example, Professors George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue observed that
while food labeling has clear nutritional information benefits,
such disclosures can foster a guilt-ridden, neurotic, shameful,
0 6
and psychologically unhealthy perspective towards eating.
However, feelings of shame related to obesity vary not only
across individuals, but also across cultures. Two economists
from the Brookings Institution, Carol Graham and Andrew Felton, recently identified a statistically negative relationship between obesity and self-reported happiness in the U.S., but a
positive correlation between obesity and self-reported happiness in Russia. 107 Nussbaum's criticisms about disgust and
shame in law are directed at cultures generally, and address
"widespread social attitudes, influential in many times and
places ... [that] are currently enjoying renewed attention in
108
contemporary American culture."
Recent empirical, experimental, and field work by anthropologists, 109 psychologists, 110 and others has found many ways
in which the experience and use of emotions in daily life and
social institutions varies across cultures. There is also recent

SPOILED IDENTITY (1968); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN

EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); Erving Goffman, Embarrassmentand Social Organization, 62 AM. J. SOC. 264 (1956); Erving Goffman, On Face-Work:An Analysis of
Ritual Elements in Social Interaction, 18 PSYCHIATRY 213 (1955).
105. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 13-16.
106. See George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 'We Can Do This the
Easy Way or the Hard Way" Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2006).
107. See Carol Graham & Andrew Felton, Variance in Obesity Across Cohorts and Countries: A Norms Based Explanation Using Happiness Surveys
(The Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Soc. and Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 42,
2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/dynamics/papers/CSED-wp42
.pdf.
108. HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 16.
109. See, e.g., MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005).

110. See, e.g., CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Ed Diener
Eunkook M. Suh eds., 2000).

&
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evidence that individuals process information differently in response to emotional advertisements, due to the motivational
and cognitive changes associated with age.11 1 One study proposes that anxiety explains the difference in social risk perceptions across gender and race. 112 This cultural and demographic
heterogeneity in emotional responses means that people are
likely to experience shame in legal situations in qualitatively
and quantitatively different ways. A sociologist recently found
that the presence and amount of shame experienced from seeking legal remedies varies across cultures, which helps explain
why the ethnic Chinese and Korean in Aotearoa New Zealand
make little use of antidiscrimination law as compared to Pacific
Island peoples and Indians. 113
Nussbaum notes that while shame varies across cultures,
it also has similarities. 114 The concept of "face" originated in
Chinese thought and is a literal translation of two Chinese
characters-lien and mien-tzu-which Chinese scholars differentiate analytically, 1 5 but whose meanings are interchangeable in many verbal settings. 116 People in particular contexts or
situations can gain or lose face, but "[t]he mechanics of gaining
face are different from those of losing it, and the two processes
do not carry the same social implications."' 17 Scholars have
suggested that in Asian cultures, losing face leads to "a diminution of standing in society"11 8 and contributes to shame, which
"often persists like a psychic scar."'1 9 Shame and hierarchy are
thus intimately related, not just in Chinese culture, but also in

111. See Patti Williams & Aimee Drolet, Age-Related Differences in Responses to EmotionalAdvertisements, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (2005).
112. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception:The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2006) (proposing cultural status anxiety to explain the "white male effect").
113. See Catherine Lane West-Newman, Feelingfor Justice? Rights, Laws,
and Cultural Contexts, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 305, 323-30 (2005).
114. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 185-86.
115. See Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of "Face,"46 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944).
116. See David Yau-fai Ho, On the Concept of Face, 81 AM. J. SOC. 867, 868
(1976).
117. West-Newman, supra note 113, at 327.
118. Id. at 328.
119. Ho, supra note 116, at 876 n.3.
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other cultures. 120 "Because Chinese social behavior is framed in
terms of mutual dependence, social face, read as social adequacy, is maintained relative to social position."'121 There are
distributions in the severity and range of losing face that extend "from temporary and only in a circumscribed area of social
life to permanent and irreversible" loss, 122 which casts doubt

over an individual's "fitness as an acceptable member of society."'123 These distributions of shame are not constant across
cultures or over time because "judgments concerning the extent, loss, or gain of face are based on sets of criteria or standards which vary both cross-culturally and over time within a
124
single culture."'
B. SHAME'S POWER AND LIMITATIONS

In Asian societies particularly, people's relationship to
"face" "exerts a mutually restrictive, even coercive, power upon
each member of the social network"'125 because "the expectations of others significantly influence how individuals decide to
act."'126 In fact, "[t]he actions of one person can affect the face of
another connected with her"' 2 7 to such a degree that in traditional Chinese society "the individual's face and the good name
of his family (his chia sheng) were virtually inseparable."'128
Similar notions of shame by association exist in such other
Asian cultures as the Japanese, 129 Korean, 30 and Singaporean.13' Contemporary scholars report that even when Asian
parents have migrated to Western nations, they still teach

120. See Whitman, supra note 7, at 2719-24 (arguing that law has to seriously take into account human impulses for hierarchy).
121. West-Newman, supra note 113, at 328.
122. Id.
123. Ho, supra note 116, at 872.
124. Id. at 874.
125. Id. at 873.
126. West-Newman, supra note 113, at 328.
127. Id.
128. Ho, supra note 116, at 880.
129. See, e.g., Takie Sugiyama Lebra, The Social Mechanism of Guilt and
Shame: The JapaneseCase, 44 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 241, 251-52 (1971).
130. See, e.g., Sungeun Yang & Paul C. Rosenblatt, Shame in Korean Families, 32 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 361, 365-66 (2001).
131. See, e.g., Rosaleen Ow & Dafna Katz, Family Secrets and the Disclosure of Distressful Information in Chinese Families, 80 J. CONTEMP. HUM.
SERVICES 620, 621-22 (1999).
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their children the concept and significance of face. 132 One of us
experienced parental "shame sharing' first-hand and powerfully in childhood. 133

Of course, shame can become dysfunctional for those people who are traumatized by shaming as youths. 134 Some parents undoubtedly rely on shaming techniques as convenient
methods to discipline or raise their children. 13 5 Such use of
shame is suboptimal, 36 both for children and society, if those
children must learn in adulthood to recover from trauma inflicted by shame. 137 However, while shame can do much damage, 138 it does not follow that shame can, should, or will have no
constructive role to play in human interactions. For instance,
anticipating feeling ashamed can motivate some children-and
even adults-to avoid certain behaviors, some of which involve
causing harm to others. In other words, shame can facilitate
39
self-control or a first-party system of social control.
Shame can spill over onto family members and close
friends of those who are shamed. Such spillovers might produce
desirable incentives for those close to a target of shame to influence a target's behavior via familial or social pressure. Alternatively, emotional spillovers might have the negative consequence of generating shame without corresponding deterrence benefits. Indeed, intended targets of shame might
come to develop immunity to shaming because people adapt
generally and quickly to emotions and feelings. 40 For example,
132. See Sheldon X. Zhang, Measuring Shaming in an Ethnic Context, 35
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 248, 250, 260 (1995).
133. As a child, Huang received a parental scolding including this admonition: "You should be ashamed of your face-losing behavior in public because
you're embarrassing not only yourself, but your parents, your brothers, your
grandmother, your family, Chinese people, human beings, and in fact all carbon-based life-forms."
134.

See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 186-89.

135. See id. at 189, 199.
136. Id. at 215.
137. See id. at 191-92.
138. See id. at 202.
139. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 23, 44 (1989) (defining and introducing a notion of first-party or selfcontrol of behavior).
140. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 88, at 137-58; Jeremy A. Blumenthal,
Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155,
168-69 (2005) (developing legal implications of inaccurate affective forecasts);
Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS
OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 13-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (ana-
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some criminals might develop new family and friends consisting of fellow criminals or members of a common gang, united by
a shared, perverse sense of pride in their criminality and lack
of morality. 141 When this happens, shame no longer effectively
deters criminal behavior.
One novel theoretical economic model of shame investigates the deterrent effects of shaming penalties. 142 Its authors
demonstrate an inverse relationship may exist between the
rate of shaming penalties and their deterrent effects. 143 The
more that people are shamed, the less effective shaming penalties become. In particular, the authors prove that increasing
the size of shaming penalties does not necessarily increase, and
in fact can even decrease, the deterrent effects of shaming penalties, because the stigma of those penalties decreases as more
people are subjected to them. 14 4 In this model, the same is true
for increasing the probability of detection or the accuracy of the
judicial process. 145 All of these results are based upon a formal
model in which the costs of searching for law-abiding commercial partners to transact with in markets and the costs of actively shunning those who have been shamed increase with the
size of the (sub) population that has been shamed. 146
These conclusions suggest that shaming penalties have
built-in limitations and can become self-destructive because extensive use of the penalties can erode their effectiveness to deter criminal acts. Hence, this theoretical model demonstrates
that shame has its own limits. Any attempts to limit shame
further, however, can be difficult. A recent experimental study
found that social emotions like shame are necessary to prevent
retaliation by those who are punished and for the viability of
punishment as an effective method of enforcing social norms of
cooperative behavior. 147

lyzing the hedonic treadmill hypothesis).
141. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 273.
142. See Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shame: Why More
Shaming May Deter Less (Aug. 24, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=789244.
143. See id. at 2.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emotions for
the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (Univ. of Amsterdam & Tinbergen Inst.,
Discussion Paper T12005-075/1, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=775524.
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C. ELIMINATING SHAME FROM THE LAW
As Nussbaum correctly points out, people can misdirect
shame at specific groups of people such as homosexuals and individuals with disabilities. 148 However, the possibility that certain members of society may choose to direct shame at those
groups does not mean that they necessarily will do so. Being
justifiably concerned with and upset about misdirection of
shame does not mean that we can purge shame from our legal
system even if we so desire.
It is as unlikely that a society will successfully implement
a "shame about shame" campaign as it is that a society will
successfully implement a "disgust with disgust" program.
Nussbaum suggests that "shame is likely to be normatively unreliable in public life, despite its potential for good." 149 Indeed,
she believes "that a liberal society has particular reasons to inhibit shame and to protect its citizens from shaming."'150 But it
will be difficult for a society to limit shame because shame
naturally attaches for most noncriminals to most acts which
are deemed to be criminal. 15 1 Criminality and shame are psychologically linked for most noncriminals because of social
norms against criminality. Society is likely to attach greater
stigma to criminal acts than noncriminal acts, such as adminis152
trative offenses, civil violations, or regulatory infractions.
People will naturally associate different levels of stigma with
differences in legal procedures, and in particular, the legally
required standards of proof which attach to alternative wrongs
153
and their associated punishments.
IV. POSITIVE ROLES FOR (POSITIVE) EMOTIONS
IN (LEGAL) DECISION MAKING
Emotions can play positive roles in the law. There is a
large body of research about how to reliably distinguish be-

148.

See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,

NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).

149.

HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 15.

150. Id.
151. See Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs (July 7, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=738403.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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tween positive and negative affective states. 1 4 Examples of
negative emotions are disgust and shame. Examples of positive
155
or elevation. 156
emotions include awe
A. POSITIVE EMOTIONS
Positive psychology, 157 a recent brainchild of Professor
Martin E.P. Seligman,15 8 focuses on positive emotions in general and on human strengths and virtues in particular, 159 instead of the absence of diseases and illnesses. A robust finding
of positive psychology is that positive emotions improve aspects
of decision making generally 160 and have an especially pronounced effect on complex decisions. 161 A few legal scholars
154. See DAVID WATSON, MOOD AND TEMPERAMENT (2000) (providing a
comprehensive review and synthesis of this research and clinical literature).
155. See generally Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, a
Moral, Spiritual,and Aesthetic Emotion, 17 COGNITION & EMOTION 297 (2003)
(presenting a summary of awe research and a conceptual approach to awe).
156. Jonathan Haidt, The Positive Emotion of Elevation, PREVENTION &
TREATMENT, Mar. 7, 2000, http://content.apa.org/journals/pre/3/l/3c.html.
157. See, e.g., Shelly L. Gable & Jonathan Haidt, What (and Why) Is Positive Psychology?, 9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 103 (2005); Martin E.P. Seligman &
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Positive Psychology: An Introduction, 55 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2000).
158. See generally MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING
THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING
FULFILLMENT (2002) (describing the positive psychology movement and its
practical application).
159. See, e.g., ALAN CARR, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS AND HUMAN STRENGTHS (2004); CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A
HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (Christopher Peterson & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., 2004).
160. See Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive
Psychology: The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions, 56 AM. PSY.
CHOLOGIST 218, 221 (2001); Barbara L. Fredrickson, What Good Are Positive
Emotions?, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 300, 308-11 (1998); Barbara L. Fredrickson
et al., What Good Are Positive Emotions in Crises?: A Prospective Study of Resilience and Emotions Following the Terrorist Attacks on the United States on
September 11th, 2001, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 365, 366 (2003);
Barbara L. Fredrickson, CultivatingPositive Emotions to Optimize Health and
Well-Being, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Mar. 7, 2000, http://content
.apa.org/journals/pre/3/1/la.html; Sonja Lyubomirsky, On Studying Positive
Emotions, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Mar. 7, 2000, http://content.apa.org/
journals/pre/3/1/5c.html.
161. See Alice M. Isen, An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making
in Complex Situations: Theoretical Issues with PracticalImplications, 11 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 75, 78-80 (2001); Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 417, 426-27 (Michael Lewis &
Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000); Alice M. Isen et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on ClinicalProblem Solving, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING
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have analyzed the roles that positive emotions such as empathy
and sympathy play in law.162
Positive psychology addresses what makes a happy and
fulfilling life from a number of perspectives.16 3 There is evidence from neuroscientific experiments, 164 positive psychology, 16 5 and psychological research, 166 that certain Buddhist
meditative practices foster well-being. Recent experimental research focuses on interventions and techniques to increase and
sustain individual happiness. 6 7 For instance, several measures
of psychological and physical well-being increased markedly in
two weeks for randomly assigned subjects who kept daily diaries of events they were grateful for, in comparison with randomly assigned individuals who kept diaries of hassles, neutral
life events, or social comparison. 6 8 Other recent empirical research examines the health benefits derived from experiencing
169
positive emotions.
An example of the implications that positive psychology
has for lawyers comes from an article coauthored by Professor
Seligman, which suggests three main reasons for lawyers' unhappiness: pessimism, high-pressure job environments with
221, 221-22 (1991).
162. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy,
Legal Storytelling and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2099 (1989); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988).
163. See generally WILLIAM C. COMPTON, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (2005) (providing an overview of positive psychology and the role of
emotions).
164. See, e.g., Marcia Barinaga, Buddhism and Neuroscience: Studying the
Well-Trained Mind, 302 SCIENCE 44, 45-46 (2003); Richard J. Davidson et al.,
Alterations in Brain and Immune Function Produced by Mindfulness Meditation, 65 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 564, 569 (2003).
165. See, e.g., MARVIN LEVINE, THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF BUDDHISM
AND YOGA: PATHS TO A MATURE HAPPINESS (2000).
166. See, e.g., Paul Ekman et al., Buddhist and Psychological Perspectives
on Emotions and Well-Being, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 59, 60
(2005).
167. See, e.g., Sonja Lyubomirsky et al., PursuingHappiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change, 9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 111 (2005).
168. See Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough, Counting Blessings
Versus Burdens: An Experimental Investigation of Gratitude and Subjective
Well-Being in Daily Life, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377, 386
(2003).
169. See, e.g., Andrew Steptoe et al., Positive Affect and Health-Related
Neuroendocrine, Cardiovascular, and Inflammatory Processes, 102 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6508 (2005).
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low decision latitude, and adversarial litigation being zerosum.

170

Seligman proposes a number of possible ways to in-

crease lawyers' happiness, including changing law-firm culin "cooperative" litigation, 172 and reforming
ture, 171 engaging
173
legal education.
Another example of the way positive emotions work to
shape law and public policy can be found in the economic reconsideration of paternalism, which is informed by empirical
and experimental findings about happiness from neuroscience 174 and psychology. 75 Final examples of positive emotions
shaping public policy are a consideration of positive emotions in
populations, 76 and a set of new proposals and empirical methods to measure societal happiness. 77 King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who by all accounts is an enlightened monarch of the
Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan, decreed his country's official
goal to be the pursuit of its gross national happiness, instead of
gross national product. 78 Governments can utilize these selfreported measures of subjective well-being to evaluate how
public policies affect social well-being. 179 Such survey data can
170.

Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO

L. REV. 33, 39-42, 46-49 (2001); see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy,
Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 888-906 (1999).
171. Seligman et al., supra note 170, at 43-46.
172. Id. at 50-51.
173. Id. at 51-53.
174. See Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience
and Paternalism,73 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2006) (proposing that
mild forms of paternalism are justified if there is a gap between what people
want and what people like).
175. See Peter H. Huang, Happiness and Law: Hedonics, Positive Psychology, Affective Neuroscience and Paternalism (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
176. See Felicia A. Huppert, Positive Mental Health in Individuals and
Populations, in THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING 307 (Felicia A. Huppert et al.

eds., 2005).
177. See Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a
Proposal for a National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34 (2000); Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for CharacterizingDaily Life Experience: The
Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl.1, 1779 fig.3 (2004);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 429 (2004).
178. Lynn Sherr, Gross National Happiness?:Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan Favors Contentment Over Commerce, ABC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://
abcnews.go.com/2020/International/story?id=1296605.
179. Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 161, 161 (2005).
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also help regulators analyze the affective or emotional impacts
180
of proposed rules.
B. NEGATIVE EMOTIONS
One can view the interplay between emotions and law
through a lens or perspective different from that of positive
psychology-namely through an analysis of how negative, unpleasant emotions can play beneficial roles in legal decision
making. As Nussbaum observes, emotions are primary sources
of meaning for most people. 18 1 Nussbaum points out that some
people would argue "that the law is based on reason and not
passion-a view recently imputed to Aristotle in the fictional
Harvard Law School classroom in the movie Legally Blond."'182
We feel it is sensible for people to prefer a legal system that
takes their emotional sources of meaning into account. Thus,
although we agree with Nussbaum that negative emotions such
as disgust might easily be abused, we believe that many people
would perceive a system of law that ignores disgust as being
inefficient.
In a worst case scenario, in which a society provides no legitimate outlet through which people can channel their feelings
of disgust, people may turn to vigilantism to punish behaviors
or identities that they find to be reprehensible. What is
needed-perhaps even more than a legal system that eliminates the negative role of disgust or other emotions-is a legal
system that takes seriously the emotions of persons and
groups, and explicitly considers the contexts in which any emotion could be considered relevant or beneficial in contributing
information to a legal decision. Law does not need to eliminate
every role of disgust within itself (were this possible), nor does
it need to try to inculcate in a population an avoidance of disgust. Law could play the positive role of delineating the types of
disgust that are relevant to the law by distinguishing between
that disgust that is related to punishable wrongdoing, and
those essentially mistaken, legally irrelevant targets of disgust.

180. Peter H. Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: Process Concerns and Emotional Impact Analysis (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/
papers/econpaper62.pdf; Peter H. Huang, Happiness and Cost-Benefit Analysis: Evaluating Policy Affect (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
181. See HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 2, at 22, 37.
182. Id. at 5.
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Ideally the law would have a clear and robust rationale for doing so. In this type of process, a legal system would play a role
of protecting minority groups from disgust-related offenses or
even disgust-related legal prejudices, without providing others
the sense that that they have to operate outside the legal system because it never considers their strong feelings to be relevant.
CONCLUSION
Hiding from Humanity provides a provocative and stimulating discussion by a prominent American legal philosopher of
her viewpoint as to why disgust and shame can and should play
minimal roles in law. However, other scholars and their disciplines also have much to contribute to a more complete and nuanced understanding of these two emotions and their normative legal status. We believe that disgust and shame are likely
to remain active for some time as part of our legal system and
its legal analysis. As Nussbaum states, her vision "in effect, is
something that I do not expect we shall ever fully achieve: a society that acknowledges its own humanity, and neither hides us
from it nor it from us." 18 3 It is uncertain if we can ever achieve

such a utopian society. In the meantime, ours is an exciting
time for scholars of law and emotions because there remain
many unanswered conceptual, empirical, experimental, and
theoretical questions about how to incorporate affect, emotions,
and moods into legal analysis, policy, practice, and theory.

183.

Id. at 17.

